Klein, J.T. 2004. Interdisciplinarity and complexity: An evolving relationship. Emergence: Complexity
and Organization 6(1-2), 2-10.

In this article, Klein traces the historical path through which the notions of complexity and interdisciplinarity have become increasingly interconnected. Klein uses various examples to demonstrate the effectiveness of this union. For example, she discusses the rise of environmental studies and its integration of business, science, and social systems in the environmental discourse and research areas. Klein does not see the integration as complete and notes a lack of a step-by-step coherence; however, she argues that the development of this program constitutes a fundamental element of the development of a more formal system of interdisciplinary studies in broader culture that is itself being revolutionized by a challenging and shifting of boundaries and borders.

In particular, I am happy to discover that there is a budding overlap between the notions of complexity theory and interdisciplinary. I have a fairly extensive background in the realm of complexity theory so perhaps this is the time to draw on this background and utilize it in my thesis work. So I am starting from scratch, so to speak, with the complexity/interdisciplinary literature.

I am starting with this article:

McMurtry, Angus (2011). “The complexities of interdisciplinarity: Integrating two different perspectives on interdisciplinary research and education.” Complicity: An International Journal of Complexity and Education. Volume 8 (2011), Number 2 • pp. 19-35 • www.complexityandeducation.ca

In this article, McMurtry argues that the interdisciplinary literature is divided into two streams of thought: those that focus on the complexity of the known and those that focus on the complexity of the knower. He argues that while both streams have been fruitful sources of insight, little dialogue exists between the two. He suggests that the conceptual framework offered by the complexity and education can provide a means of integrating the two perspectives without conflating them, thus offering a more thorough means of conducting interdisciplinary education and research.

The conceptual framework offered by the complexity and education literature suggests that because learning involves various interconnected systems (cognitive, neurological, language, social etc), a transdiciplinary approach is necessary. Complexity theory presents various levels of interactions. or relationships, as the basic focus of inquiry. In other words, complexity looks at the emergent properties of various interconnected phenomena thus it provides means of inquiry into seemingly (possibly) incommensurable spheres. The level of emergence is different from the level upon which the systems’ parts and pieces interact.

The author describes it like this: “complexity thinking offers a means to conceptually bridge such seemingly incompatible disciplinary perspectives. It does so by emphasizing that different sorts or levels of phenomena embody emergent qualities that transcend their parts and reflect their unique histories; they therefore need to be studied “at the levels of their emergence” (p. 2). Complexity can thus act as sort of “interdiscourse,” negotiating the relationships between disciplinary discourses—while never reducing or conflating  them” (21).

In the application to the conceptual divide in interdisciplinary literature, complexity theory acts as a reflective agent that sees knowers as themselves adaptive self-organizing systems thus allowing the socio-cultural dynamics such as cooperation and domination to be considered as themselves emergent properties of complex systems. This is to say that complexivist thinking on interdisciplinarity will take into consideration the embodied material reality (the known phenomena) as an element of, not an opposition to, socio-cultural dynamics. Disciplinary structures can thus be seen in a historical light that brings its dynamics and developments into view disrupting its typical standing as a completed self-sufficient closed system. Once understood as open and dynamic, multidisciplinary interactions can be seen which allows for a broadened perspective and an understanding of interdisciplinarity as a process more so than a product.

McMurty questions the imperative to frame knowledge in representational terms. He draws on pragmatist and constructivist framework familiar to the complexity and education genre to suggest that knowledge be considered in “terms of coherence, viability or fit with local needs and constraints, rather than correspondence with an ‘objective’ reality” (31). This conceptual framework, according to the author is more fruitful for interdisciplinarity because it allows for the validity of multiple perspectives appropriate to respective contexts rather than a single ‘correct’ view of the world.

While I do not have too much to say about this article just yet, I find myself in a ‘so-what’ frame of mind as I think about this issue. Relegating everything to various levels of complexity, adding layers to layers to make a point, is itself a type of reduction. Moreover, that everything is complex, even complexity itself, be it interdicsiplinarity or disciplinarity, seems to be too simplistic.

These chapters cover two interesting figures in religious studies: Giambattista Vico and David Hume.

I am not going to go into detail as Wikipedia does much better, but I am just going to pose a few questions that arose as I was reading. I have discussed these with my professor and am satisfied with the answers, but as always, I find that questioning is more of a means to explore in different directions than inquiries that require resolution.

Vico described historical myth as poetic and used this as a framework for interpretation. His method introduced and relied on what he called “maker’s knowledge.” He suggested that since humans make society then humans can share in empathic-type knowledge about it. In fact, Vico sees religion as a human product necessary for social order. Though religion is man-made, he suggests that humans have a divinely implanted religious sense.

A key element of this perspective is a separation of meaning and causality, but how does this work if it is even possible?

The concept of salvation is paramount in religious studies discussions, but what is the framework of this concept? Salvation from what? From death? Sometime salvation refers to eternal life, other times it refers to transformation in present life, and sometimes both. Is it salvation from pain or suffering? I know what salvation means in an evangelical context, but where did this idea come from and why is it such a powerful force?

I was very interested to read about Hume. I did not realize the extent to which his work influenced atheism. Of particular interest was his critique of arguments for the existence of god based on analogy and directional causality. The analogy argument for god compares artifacts of human construction with naturally occurring objects. For example, one might say that just as a building has an architect so a flower has a designer. This of course is a bad analogy for numerous reasons not the least of which is that we can see the construction of buildings via workers whereas flowers seem to grow on their own. The directional causality issue undermines the notion that god as spirit or mind can create matter. Hume pointed out that matter leads to mind and not the other way around, thus the notion of creation is undermined in this instance.

As an aside, Hume draws on Ockam’s razor or the principle of parsimony to argue against the inclusion of god in natural explanations. While I do see his point, I am not sure why Ockam’s razor is itself justified. Why is the simplest the best?

The five truths are perhaps so well known that they do not need repeating, but I cannot name them and had to search it elsewhere online. This chapter does not cite them specifically, which is curious to me. There is a specific reference to them on page 36, but in that reference, I am not sure how to count them properly because as I read it there are either 4 or 6.

So, for those of you who are not familiar with the five catholic truths, here they are:

1.

Okay, this has proven to be a particularly difficult search. I do not understand why this is so. I just want a simple list, but each of the google hits require a fair bit of reading and a bit of deduction. What is going on? What am I missing?

Please note that the lack of entries over the past semester does not in anyway reflect a lack of engagement with my studies, quite the contrary actually. Well, I guess it does, sort of, because the majority of my semester was spent writing proposals, grant applications, and revising an article that was accepted for publication. I did manage get some reading done though. I will list some of the readings soon.

Anyway, today’s reading was an introduction to the study of religion. Here is the reference:

Preus, J. Samuel. Explaining Religion: Criticism and Theory from Bodin to Freud. Yale University Press, 1987.

Part 1 Religion as a Problem

Chapter 1 Conflict, Contradiction, and Impasse: Jean Bodin

This chapter refers to Bodin’s Colloquium to introduce three major themes in the study of religion. These are:

1. truth, rationality, objective knowledge

2. the role of religion in public realm (politics)

3. the expression of religion in personal lives and behaviours

According to Bodin, truth is external and transcendental to religious expression, is harmonious with reason, and is grounded in nature.
Although all religions defile truth in some way, religions are necessary to the peaceful operations of society. Religious pluralism can extend social harmony to private sphere by granting autonomy to individuals to decide their own positions. A pure heart–honesty, sincerity, and integrity–are a more acceptable route to salvation than truth or religion (because truth is debatable and construed differently in the vast array of religions).

While this is a very interesting and accessible introduction to the study of religion, I cannot help but wonder: what is the role of power? I suppose a turn to Foucault is in order here, but I want to think about this on my own first. Clearly, what is at issue are social-organizing practices and the state of power distribution within social structures. If religion is a utility driven phenomena, then who or what is behind it? We could perhaps turn to evolutionary ideas about the role of social structures for survival, but for the moment, that seems a little too cold and sterile of a response (though it may ultimately be true). I think we have to look at some of the very personal implications of religion. What does it mean in the day-to-day lives of practitioners? I’m sure there is lots of literature on this, but I want more than an academic study. What does it mean personally, experientially, anecdotally? I think that is where I need to look for the moment.

Anyway, I am starting with this one, though there will likely lots more.

video

The point that I am making is that I am going to draw widely on an array of media sources to inform my work. In this era, the written word is but one tool in the educational venture. Let’s see how widely I can cast my net of inquiry.

My institution, and my disciplines in particular, are quite traditional. Perhaps my place of resistance is here. Academic activism? We’ll see.

Biology and Philosophy 2 (1987) 145-166.
© 1987 by D. Reidel Publishing Company

Are species actual objects in the world or are they sets of objects that share some fundamental characteristics?

The Abstract (ver batum)

(1) Biological species are not classes, as traditionally defined, because they have no essence and because they have various properties (see 2 and 3) that are incompatible with the class concept.

(2) Among non-class properties of species are their spatiotemporal localization, their boundedness, their internal cohesiveness, and their capacity to change (evolve).

(3) Other non-class properties of species are their propensity for splitting (speciating). for fusing (by hybridization), and for becoming extinct, none applicable to classes.

(4) To call a species a set, and defining as set any aggregate of more than a single entity, would completely destroy the usefulness and unique characterization of the species in biological science.

(5) Properties in common of taxa of all ranks are not essences, since they are variable and have the potential for evolution.

(6) Even though ignored by philosophers, the non-class nature of species was recognized by naturalists from John Ray (1686) and Buffon (1753) to the 1960s. By that time it was virtually unanimously recognized by biologists.

(7) In order to make the non-class nature of biological species more visible, Ghiselin (1974) and Hull (1976) have proposed to consider them individuals.

(8) Most biologists and some philosophers have however been unhappy about calling a species an individual, when it actually may consist of millions or billions of individual organisms and show much less cohesion than a single individual.

(9) It is proposed that the term population, applied by naturalists to species for more than 100 years, be added to the vocabulary of the philosophers of science to designate a phenomenon of nature, biological species, for which neither the term class (set) nor the term individual is appropriate.

(10) Only sexually reproducing organisms qualify as species. Some other terminology, for instance paraspecies, will have to be found for uniparentally reproducing forms. Higher taxa are neither classes nor individuals but may be designated, following Wiley, as ‘historical groups.’ Grades are classes.

This chapter engages two key components of the philosophy of biology: adaptationism and phylogenetics. At the heart of this chapter is an argument for a conceptual/methodological distinction between the evolutionary origin and maintenance of traits as it pertains to ultimate causation. The authors argue that phylogenetics–or biological development–as is operational within the ontogenetic process (the process of becoming)– is the best explanation for the appearance of novelty whereas adaptation is limited to action upon an already existing trait.

This distinction–between origin and maintenance–is important because it delineates and defines the function of an adaptionist approach while simultaneously hedging it from resurgent criticism. One such criticism, for example, suggests that the adaptationist program is so pervasive that almost anything can be defined as an adaptation. In other words, a story about why such and such a trait came to be can be constructed for virtually any trait, and even if said story can be proven to be untrue, another story can readily supplant it without calling into question the issue of adaptationism as a whole. The authors argue that the role of an adaptationist approach is to distinguish between selected and unselected traits, and more specifically, directly or indirectly selected traits. Adaptationsim can only work on what already exists thus its explanatory power is rather specifically limited.

Using phylogenetics in conjunction with homology (a cross-species comparison of similar-looking traits), and keeping the principle of parsimony in mind, evolutionary origins within the Tree of Life are reliably ascertainable. The authors are careful to point out that indication of a shared ancestral lineage does not necessarily equate to the transposition of the studies of other primate sexuality to human sexuality, even though there might be some benefit to such considerations.